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Abstract
In this article, we consider a compound Poisson-type model for households’ capital. Using
risk theory techniques, we determine the probability of a household falling under the poverty
line. Microinsurance is then introduced to analyse its impact as an insurance solution for the
lower income class. Our results validate those previously obtained with this type of model,
showing that microinsurance alone is not sufficient to reduce the probability of falling into the
area of poverty for specific groups of people, since premium payments constrain households’
capital growth. This indicates the need for additional aid particularly from the government.
As such, we propose several premium subsidy strategies and discuss the role of government in
subsidising microinsurance to help reduce poverty.
Keywords— microinsurance; poverty traps; trapping probability; cost of social protection;
government subsidies.
1 Introduction
Inclusive insurance (or microinsurance) relates to the provision of insurance services to low-income
populations with limited access to mainstream insurance or alternative effective risk management
strategies. Many individuals excluded from basic financial services and those microinsurance aims
to proctect, live below the minimum level of income required to meet their basic needs. Currently
fixed at $1.90 USD per day, 9.2% of the population were estimated to live below the international
extreme poverty line in 2017 (?). Increases in the number of new poor and those returning to
poverty as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic are expected to reverse the historically declining
poverty trend (?).
Fundamental features of the microinsurance environment such as the nature of low income risks,
limited financial literacy and experience, product accessibility and data availability, create barriers
to penetration, particularly in relation to the affordability of products. For the proportion of
the population living just above the poverty line, premium payments heighten the risk of poverty
trapping and induce a balance between profit and loss as a result of insurance coverage, dependent
on the entity’s level of capital. Here, poverty trapping refers to the inability of the poor to escape
poverty without external help (Kovacevic and Pflug, 2011).
Highlighting vulnerability reduction and investment incentive effects of insurance, Janzen et al.
(2020) observe a marked reduction in long-term poverty and the social protection costs required to
close the poverty gap following introduction of an asset insurance market. Calibrating their model
























line do not optimally purchase insurance (without subsidies), suppressing their consumption and
mitigating the probability of trapping. Kovacevic and Pflug (2011) propose negative consequences
of insurance uptake for members of low-income populations closest to the poverty line, applying
ruin-theoretic approaches to calculation of the trapping probability. ? support these findings in
their analysis of a multi-equilibrium model with agricultural output risks on data from rural China.
Voluntary insurance would enable individuals close to the poverty threshold to opt out of insurance
purchase in favour of alternative risk management strategies, in order to mitigate this risk.
In line with the findings of ? on the effectiveness of social protection mechanisms for poverty alle-
viation, ? observe a greater reduction in poverty through implementation of an integrated social
protection programme in comparison to pure cash transfers. Government subsidised premiums are
the most common form of aid in the context of insurance. Besides reducing the impact on household
capital growth, lowering consumer premium payments has the potential to increase microinsurance
take-up, with wealth and product price positively and negatively influencing microinsurance de-
mand, respectively (Eling et al., 2014).
Poverty traps are typically studied in the context of economics, with a large literature focus on
why economic stagnation below the poverty line occurs in certain communities. While the poor
could readily grow their way out of poverty by adopting profitable strategies such as productive asset
accumulation, opportunistic exchange and implementation of cost-effective production technologies,
poverty traps are underlined by poverty reinforcing behaviours induced by the state of being poor
(?). A detailed description of the mechanics of the poverty trap state is provided by ?. In studying
the probability of falling into such a trap, “trapping” describes the event in which a household falls
underneath the poverty line and into the area of poverty.
In this paper, we adopt the ruin-theoretic approach to calculating the trapping probability of house-
holds in low-income populations presented by Kovacevic and Pflug (2011), adapting the piecewise
deterministic Markov process such that households are subject to large shocks of random size. In
line with the poverty trap ideology, we assume that the area of poverty to be an absorbing state
and so consider only the state of events above the poverty threshold. Obtaining explicit solutions
for the trapping probability, we compare the influence of three structures of microinsurance on the
ability of households to stay above the poverty line. Specifically, we consider a (i) proportional,
(ii) subsidised proportional and (iii) subsidised proportional with barrier microinsurance scheme.
Aligning with the essential place for governmental support in the provision of social protection
which encompasses risk mitigation, we assess for the first time in this context, to the best of our
knowledge, the impact of a (government) subsidised insurance scheme with barrier strategy. We
optimise the barrier level in the context of the trapping probability and the governmental cost of
social protection, identifying the proportion of the population for which such a product would be
beneficial. Here, the cost of social protection is defined to account for the provision of government
subsidies, in addition to the cost of lifting a household from poverty, should they fall underneath
the threshold. The benefit of subsidy schemes for poverty reduction is measured through obser-
vation of this governmental cost, in addition to the trapping probability of the households under
consideration.
The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the household
capital model and its associated infinitesimal generator. The (trapping) time at which a household
falls into the area of poverty is defined in Section 3, and subsequently the explicit trapping prob-
ability and the expected trapping time are derived for the basic uninsured model. Links between
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classical ruin theoretic models and the trapping model of this paper are stated in Sections 2 and 3.
Microinsurance is introduced in Section 4, where we assume a proportion of household losses are
covered by a microinsurance policy. The capital model is redefined and the trapping probability is
derived. Sections 5 and 6 consider the case where households are proportionally insured through
a government subsidised microinsurance scheme, with the impact of a subsidy barrier discussed in
Section 6. Optimisation of the subsidy and barrier levels is presented in Sections 5 and 6, alongside
the associated governmental cost of social protection. Concluding remarks are provided in Section
7.
2 The Capital Model
The fundamental dynamics of the model follow those of Kovacevic and Pflug (2011), where the
growth in accumulated capital (Xt) of an individual household is given by
dXt
dt
= r · [Xt − x∗]+ , (2.1)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0). The capital growth rate r incorporates household rates of consumption,
income generation and investment or savings, while x∗ > 0 represents the threshold below which a
household lives in poverty. Reflecting the ability of a household to produce, accumulated capital
(Xt) is composed of land, property, physical and human capital, with health a form of capital in
extreme cases where sufficient health services and food accessibility are not guaranteed (Dasgupta,
1997). The notion of a household in this model setting may be extended for consideration of poverty
trapping within economic units such as community groups, villages and tribes, in addition to the
traditional household structure.
The dynamical process in (2.1) is constructed such that consumption is assumed to be an increasing
function of wealth (for full details of the model construction see Kovacevic and Pflug (2011)). The
poverty threshold x∗ represents the amount of capital required to forever attain a critical level of
income, below which a household would not be able to sustain their basic needs, facing elementary
problems relating to health and food security. Throughout the paper, we will refer to this threshold
as the critical capital or the poverty line. Since (2.1) is positive for all levels of capital greater
than the critical capital, points less than or equal to x∗ are stationary (capital remains constant if
the critical level is not met). In this basic model, stationary points below the critical capital are
not attractors of the system if the initial capital exceeds x∗, in which case the capital process (Xt)
grows exponentially with rate r.
Using capital as an indicator of financial stability over other commonly used measures such as
income enables a more effective analysis of a household’s wealth and well-being. Households with
relatively high income, considerable debt and few assets would be highly vulnerable if a loss of
income was to occur, while low-income households could live comfortably on assets acquired during
more prosperous years for a long-period of time (Gartner et al., 2004).
In line with Kovacevic and Pflug (2011), we expand the dynamics of (2.1) under the assumption
households are susceptible to the occurrence of large capital losses, including severe illness, the death
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of a household member or breadwinner and catastrophic events such as floods and earthquakes. We
assume occurrence of these events follows a Poisson process with intensity λ, where the capital
process follows the dynamics of (2.1) between events. On the occurrence of a loss, the household’s
capital at the event time reduces by a random amount Zi. The sequence (Zi) is independent of the
Poisson process and i.i.d. with common distribution function G. In contrast to Kovacevic and Pflug
(2011), we assume reduction by a given amount rather than a random proportion of the capital
itself. This adaptation enables analysis of a tractable mathematical model without threatening the
core objective of studying the probability that a household falls into the area of poverty.
A household reaches the area of poverty if it suffers a loss large enough that the remaining capital
is attracted into the poverty trap. Since a household’s capital does not grow below the critical
capital x∗, households that fall into the area of poverty will never escape. Once below the critical
capital, households are exposed to the risk of falling deeper into poverty, with a risk of negative
capital due to the dynamics of the model. A reduction in a household’s capital below zero could
represent a scenario where total debt exceeds total assets, resulting in negative capital net worth.
The experience of a household below the critical capital is, however, out of the scope of this paper.
We will now formally define the stochastic capital process, where the process for the inter-event
household capital (2.2) is derived through solution of the first order ordinary differential equation
(2.1). This model is an adaptation of the model proposed by Kovacevic and Pflug (2011).
Definition 1. Let Ti be the ith event time of a Poisson process (Nt) with parameter λ, where T0 = 0.
Let Zi ≥ 0 be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with distribution function G, independent of






er(t−Ti−1) + x∗ if XTi−1 > x∗,
XTi−1 otherwise.
(2.2)





er(Ti−Ti−1) + x∗ − Zi if XTi−1 > x∗,
XTi−1 − Zi otherwise.
(2.3)
The stochastic process (Xt)t≥0 is a piecewise-determinsitic Markov process (Davis, 1984) and its
infinitesimal generator is given by
(Af)(x) = r(x− x∗)f ′(x) + λ
∫ ∞
0
[f(x− z)− f(x)] dG(z), x ≥ x∗.
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The capital model as defined in (2.2) and (2.3) is actually a well-studied topic in ruin theory since
the 1940s. Here, modelling is done from the point of view of an insurance company. Consider the
insurer’s surplus process (Ut)t≥0 given by







where u is the insurer’s initial capital, p is the constant premium rate, a is the risk-free interest rate,
Nt is a Poisson process with parameter λ which counts the number of claims in the time interval
[0, t], and (Zi)∞i=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. claim sizes with distribution function G. This model is
also called the insurance risk model with deterministic investment, which was first proposed by
Segerdahl (1942) and subsequently studied by Harrison (1977) and Sundt and Teugels (1995). For
a detailed literature review on this model prior to the turn of the century, readers can consult
Paulsen (1998).
Observe that when p = 0, the insurance model (2.4) for positive surplus is equivalent to the capital
model (2.2) and (2.3) above the poverty line x∗ = 0. Subsequently, the capital growth rate r
in our model corresponds to the risk-free investment rate a of the insurer’s surplus model. More
connections between these two models will be made in the next section after the first hitting time
is introduced.
3 The Trapping Time
Let
τx := inf {t ≥ 0 : Xt < x∗ | X0 = x}
denote the time at which a household with initial capital x ≥ x∗ falls into the area of poverty
(the trapping time), where ψ(x) = P(τx < ∞) is the infinite-time trapping probability. To study
the distribution of the trapping time, we apply the expected discounted penalty function at ruin
concept commonly used in actuarial science (Gerber and Shiu, 1998), such that with a force of
interest δ ≥ 0 and initial capital x ≥ x∗, we consider
mδ(x) = E
[
w(| Xτx − x∗ |)e−δτx1{τx<∞}
]
, (3.1)
where | Xτx − x∗ | is the deficit at the trapping time and w(x) is an arbitrary non-negative penalty
function. For more details on the so called Gerber-Shiu risk theory, the interested reader may
wish to consult Kyprianou (2013). Using standard arguments based on the infinitesimal generator,
mδ(x) can be characterised as the solution of the Integro-Differential Equation (IDE)
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r(x− x∗)m′δ(x)− (λ+ δ)mδ(x) + λ
∫ x−x∗
0






Due to the lack of memory property, we consider the case in which losses (Zi) are exponentially
distributed with parameter α > 0. Specifying the penalty function such that w(x) = 1, mδ(x)
becomes the Laplace transform of the trapping time, also interpreted as the expected present value
of a unit payment due at the trapping time. Equation (3.2) can then be written such that
r(x− x∗)m′δ(x)− (λ+ δ)mδ(x) + λ
∫ x−x∗
0
mδ(x− z)αe−αzdz = −λe−α(x−x






to both sides of (3.3), together with a number of algebraic manip-













mδ(x) = 0, x ≥ x∗. (3.4)
Letting f(y) := mδ(x), such that y is associated with the change of variable y := y(x) = −α(x−x∗),
(3.4) reduces to Kummer’s Confluent Hypergeometric Equation (Slater, 1960)
y · f ′′(y) + (c− y)f ′(y)− af(y) = 0, y < 0, (3.5)
for a = − δr and c = 1 −
λ+δ
r , with regular singular point at y = 0 and irregular singular point at
y = −∞ (corresponding to x = x∗ and x =∞, respectively). A general solution of (3.5) is given by
mδ(x) = f(y) =
{
1 x < x∗,
A1M
(













for arbitrary constants A1, A2 ∈ R. Here,
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is Kummer’s Confluent Hypergeometric Function (Kummer, 1837) and (a)n =
Γ(a+n)
Γ(n) denotes the
Pochhammer symbol (Seaborn, 1991). In a similar manner,
U(a, c; z) =
{
Γ(1−c)
Γ(1+a−c)M(a, c; z) +
Γ(c−1)
Γ(a) z
1−cM(1 + a− c, 2− c; z) c /∈ Z,
limθ→c U(a, θ; z) c ∈ Z
is Tricomi’s Confluent Hypergeometric Function (Tricomi, 1947). This function is generally complex-
valued when its argument z is negative, i.e. when x ≥ x∗ in the case of interest. We seek a
real-valued solution of mδ(x) over the entire domain, therefore an alternative independent pair of
solutions, here, M(a, c; z) and ezU(c− a, c;−z), to (3.5) are chosen for x ≥ x∗.
To determine the constants A1 and A2, we use the boundary conditions at x∗ and at infinity. Apply-
ing equation (13.1.27) of Abramowitz and Stegun (1972), also known as Kummer’s Transformation





















for x ≥ x∗. For z →∞, it is well-known that
















(see for example, equations (13.1.4) and (13.1.8) of Abramowitz and Stegun (1972)). Asymptotic




















respectively. For x → ∞, (3.8) is unbounded, while (3.9) tends to zero. The boundary condition
limx→∞mδ(x) = 0, by definition of mδ(x) in (3.1), thus implies that A1 = 0. Letting x = x∗ in












Hence, A2 = λ(λ+δ)U(1−λr ,1−λ+δr ;0)
















(i) Figure 1(a) shows that the Laplace transform of the trapping time approaches the trapping
probability as δ tends to zero, i.e.
lim
δ↓0
mδ(x) = P(τx <∞) ≡ ψ(x).















Figure 1(b) displays the trapping probability ψ(x) for the stochastic capital process Xt. We
can further simplify the expression for the trapping probability using the upper incomplete
gamma function Γ(a; z) =
∫∞
z
e−tta−1dt. Applying the relation
Γ(a; z) = e−zU(1− a, 1− a; z)
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(see equation (6.5.3) of Abramowitz and Stegun (1972)) and the fact that Γ(a; 0) = Γ(a) for
























































Figure 1: (a) Laplace transform mδ(x) of the trapping time when Zi ∼ Exp(1), r = 0.5, λ = 1,




128 (b) Trapping probability ψ(x) when Zi ∼ Exp(α), r = 0.5, λ = 1,
x∗ = 1 for α = 0.8, 1, 1.5, 2.
(ii) As an application of the Laplace transform of the trapping time, one particular quantity of
interest is the expected trapping time. This can be obtained by taking the derivative ofmδ(x),
where







As such, we differentiate Tricomi’s Confluent Hypergeometric Function with respect to its
second parameter. Denote
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U (c)(a, c; z) ≡ d
dc
U(a, c; z).
A closed form expression of the aforementioned derivative can be given in terms of series
expansions, such that



















, c /∈ Z,
(3.12)
where η(z) = d ln[Γ(z)]dz =
Γ′(z)
Γ(z) corresponds to equation (6.3.1) of Abramowitz and Stegun










1− λr , 1−
λ
r ; 0






















In line with intuition, the expected trapping time is an increasing function of both the capital
growth rate r and initial capital x. However, since the capital process grows exponentially,
large initial capital and capital growth rates significantly reduce the trapping probability and
increase the expected trapping time to the point where it becomes non-finite, making the
indicator function in the expected discounted penalty function (3.1) tend to zero. A number



















Figure 2: Expected trapping time when Zi ∼ Exp(1), λ = 1 and x∗ = 1 for r = 0.02, 0.05, 0.08.
(iii) The ruin probability for the insurance model (2.4) given by
ξ(u) = P (Ut < 0 for some t > 0 | U0 = u),
is found by Sundt and Teugels (1995) to satisfy the IDE
(au+ p)ξ′(u)− λξ(u) + λ
∫ u
0
ξ(u− z) dG(z) + λ(1−G(u)) = 0, u ≥ 0. (3.13)
Note that when p = 0, (3.13) coincides with the special case of (3.2) when x∗ = 0, w(x) = 1,
and δ = 0. Thus, the household’s trapping time can be thought of as the insurer’s ruin time.
Indeed, the ruin probability in the case of exponential claims when p = 0 as shown in Section
6 of Sundt and Teugels (1995) is exactly the same as the trapping probability (3.11) when
x∗ = 0.
4 Introducing Microinsurance
As in Kovacevic and Pflug (2011), we assume that households have the option of enrolling in a
microinsurance scheme that covers a certain proportion of the capital losses they encounter. The
microinsurance policy has proportionality factor 1−κ, where κ ∈ [0, 1], such that 100·(1−κ) percent
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of the damage is covered by the microinsurance provider. The premium rate paid by households,
calculated according to the expected value principle is given by
π(κ, θ) = (1 + θ) · (1− κ) · λ · E(Zi),
where θ is some loading factor. The expected value principle is popular due to its simplicity and
transparency. When θ = 0, one can consider π(κ, θ) to be the pure risk premium (Albrecher et al.,
2017). We assume the basic model parameters are unchanged by the introduction of microinsurance
coverage.
The stochastic capital process of a household covered by a microinsurance policy is denoted by
X (κ)t . We differentiate between all variables and parameters relating to the original uninsured and
insured processes by using the superscript (κ) in the latter case.
Since the premium is paid from a household’s income, the capital growth rate r is adjusted such
that it reflects the lower rate of income generation resulting from the need for premium payment.
The premium rate is restricted to prevent certain poverty, which would occur should the premium
rate exceed the rate of income generation. The capital growth rate of the insured household r(κ) is
lower than that of the uninsured household, while the critical capital is higher.
In between jumps, where Ti−1 ≤ t < Ti, the insured stochastic growth process X(κ)t behaves in the
same manner as (2.2), with parameters corresponding to the proportional insurance case of this
section, making particular note of the increased critical capital x(κ)∗:
X (κ)t =
{(




(κ)(t−Ti−1) + x(κ)∗ if X (κ)Ti−1 > x
(κ)∗,
X (κ)Ti−1 otherwise.
For t = Ti, the process is given by
X (κ)Ti =
{(




(κ)(Ti−Ti−1) + x(κ)∗ − κ · Zi if X (κ)Ti−1 > x
(κ)∗,
X (κ)Ti−1 − κ · Zi otherwise.
By enrolling in a microinsurance scheme, a household’s capital losses are reduced to Yi := κ · Zi.
Considering the case in which losses follow an exponential distribution with parameter α > 0, the
structure of (3.3) remains the same. However, acquisition of a proportional microinsurance policy
changes the parameter of the distribution of the random variable of the losses (Yi). Namely, we have
that Yi ∼ Exp (α(κ)) for κ ∈ (0, 1], where α(κ) := ακ . We can therefore utilise the results obtained



















where y(κ)(x) = −α(κ) (x− x(κ)∗). Figure 3(a) displays the Laplace transform m(κ)δ (x) for varying
values of δ.
Remarks.




























































Figure 3: (a) Laplace transform m(κ)δ (x) of the trapping time when Zi ∼ Exp(1), r = 0.5, λ = 1,




128 (b) Trapping probability ψ
(κ)(x) when Zi ∼
Exp(α), r = 0.5, λ = 1, x(κ)∗ = 1, κ = 0.5 and θ = 0.5 for α = 0.8, 1, 1.5, 2.
(ii) When κ = 0 the household has full microinsurance coverage, the microinsurance provider
covers the total capital loss experienced by the household. On the other hand, when κ = 1,
no coverage is provided by the insurer i.e., Xt = X (κ)t .
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(iii) We are interested in studying significant capital losses, since low-income individuals are com-
monly exposed to this type of shock. Hence, throughout the paper, the parameter α > 0
should be considered to reflect the desired loss behaviour.
Figure 4 presents a comparison between the trapping probabilities of the insured and uninsured
processes. As in Kovacevic and Pflug (2011), households with initial capital close to the critical
capital (here, the critical capital x∗ = 1), i.e. the most vulnerable individuals, do not receive a
real benefit from enrolling in a microinsurance scheme. Although subscribing to a proportional mi-
croinsurance scheme reduces capital losses, premium payments appear to make the most vulnerable
households more prone to falling into the area of poverty. In Figure 4, the intersection point of the
two probabilities corresponds to the boundary between households that benefit from the uptake of
microinsurance and those who are adversely affected.


























Figure 4: Trapping probabilities for the uninsured and insured capital processes, when Zi ∼ Exp(1),
r = 0.5, λ = 1, κ = 0.5, θ = 0.5 and x∗ = 1.
5 Microinsurance with Subsidised Constant Premiums
5.1 General Setting
Since microinsurance alone is not enough to reduce the likelihood of impoverishment for those close
to the poverty line, additional aid is required. In this section, we study the cost-effectiveness of gov-
ernment subsidised premiums, considering the case in which the government subsidises an amount
β = θ − θ∗, while the microinsurance provider claims a lower loading factor θ∗ (Kovacevic and
Pflug, 2011). The following relationship between premiums for the non-subsidised and subsidised
microinsurance schemes therefore holds
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π(κ, θ) = (1 + θ) · (1− κ) · λ · E(Z) ≥ (1 + θ∗) · (1− κ) · λ · E(Z) = π(κ, θ∗).
Naturally, we assume governments are interested in optimising the subsidy provided to house-
holds. Governments should provide subsidies to microinsurance providers such that they enhance
households’ benefits of enrolling in microinsurance schemes, however, they also need to gauge the
cost-effectiveness of subsidy provision. Households with capital very close to the critical capital will
not benefit from enrolling into the scheme even if the entire loading factor θ is subsidised by the
government, however, more privileged households will. One approach to finding the optimal loading





∗)(x) and ψ(x) denote the trapping probabilities of the insured subsidised and uninsured
processes, respectively, since all loading factors below the optimal loading factor will induce a
trapping probability lower than that of the uninsured process through a reduction in premium.
This behaviour can be seen in Figure 5(a), while the “richest” households do not need help from the
government since the non-subsidised insurance lowers their trapping probability below the uninsured
case, the poorest individuals require more support. Moreover, as highlighted previously, there
are households that do not receive any benefit from enrolling in the microinsurance scheme even
when the government subsidises the entire loading factor (when households pay only the pure risk
premium, this could occur if the government absorbs all premium administrative expenses). Note
that Figure 5(b) illustrates the optimal loading factor θ∗ for varying initial capital. Initial capitals
are plotted from the point at which households begin benefiting from the subsidised microinsurance
scheme, i.e. the point at which the dashed (θ = 0, β = 0.5) line intersects the solid line in Figure
5(a). Additionally, Figure 5(b) verifies that, from the point at which the dashed-dotted (insured
household) line intersects the solid line in Figure 5(a), the optimal loading factor remains constant,
with θ∗ = 0.5, i.e. the “richest” households can afford to pay the entire premium.
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Insured Subsidised Household (θ* = 0, β = 0.5)
Insured Subsidised Household (θ* = 0.25, β = 0.25)
Insured Household
(a)











Figure 5: (a) Trapping probabilities for the uninsured, insured and insured subsidised capital
processes when Zi ∼ Exp(1), r = 0.5, λ = 1, x∗ = 1, κ = 0.5 and θ = 0.5 for loading factors
θ∗ = 0, 0.25 (b) Optimal loading factor θ∗ for varying initial capitals when Zi ∼ Exp(1), r = 0.5,
λ = 1, x∗ = 1, κ = 0.5 and θ = 0.5.
5.2 Cost of Social Protection
Next, we assess government cost-effectiveness for the provision of microinsurance premium subsidies
to households. Let δ ≥ 0 be the force of interest for valuation, and let S denote the present value




e−δtdt = βāτx .
We assume a government provides subsidies according to the strategy introduced earlier, i.e. the
government subsidises an amount β = θ − θ∗, while the microinsurance provider claims a lower
loading factor θ∗.
For x ≥ x(κ,θ∗)∗, where x(κ,θ∗)∗ denotes the critical capital of the insured subsidised process, let V (x)
be the expected discounted premium subsidies provided by the government to a household with
initial capital x until trapping time, that is,
V (x) = E
[








, we can define m(κ,θ
∗)
δ (x), the Laplace transform of the trapping time with
rate r(κ,θ∗) and critical capital x(κ,θ∗)∗, using the Laplace transform for the insured process previously



























where y(κ,θ∗)(x) = −α(κ)(x− x(κ,θ∗)∗). We now formally define the government’s cost of social protec-
tion.
Definition 2. Let ψ(κ,θ
∗)(x) be the trapping probability of a household enrolled in a subsidised
microinsurance scheme with initial capital x. Additionally, let M > 0 be a constant representing
the cost to lift households below the critical capital out of the area of poverty. The government’s
cost of social protection is given by
Cost of Social Protection := V (x) +M · ψ(κ,θ
∗)(x).
Remarks.
(i) For uninsured households, the government does not provide subsidies, i.e. V (x) = 0. Fur-
thermore, we consider their trapping probability to be ψ(x).
(ii) The government manages selection of an appropriate force of interest δ ≥ 0 and constant
M > 0. For lower force of interest the government discounts future subsidies more heavily,
while for higher interest future subsidies almost vanish. The constant M could be defined, for
example, using the poverty gap index introduced by ?, or in such a way that the government
ensures with some probability that households will not fall into the area of poverty. Thus,
higher values of M will increase the certainty that households will not return to poverty.
Figure 6 displays the government cost of social protection. Observe that in this particular example,
we consider high values for both the force of interest δ and the constant M . The choice of M
is motivated by Figure 4, which shows that from x = 8, the trapping probability for uninsured
households is very close to zero. Note that a high value of δ hands a lower weight to future
government subsidies whereas a high value of M grants higher certainty that a household will not
return to the area of poverty once lifted out.
It is clear that governments do not benefit by entirely subsidising the “richest” households, since they
will subsidise premiums indefinitely, almost surely (dashed line for highest values of initial capital).
Hence, as illustrated in Figure 5(b), it is favourable for governments to remove subsidies for this
particular group since their cost of social protection is even higher than when uninsured (solid line for
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highest values of initial capital). Conversely, governments perceive a lower cost of social protection
when fully subsidising the loading factor θ for households with initial capital lying closer to the
critical capital x∗. The cost of social protection when households pay only the pure risk premium is
lower than when paying the premium entirely for values of initial capital in which the dashed line is
below the dotted, in which case the government should support premium payments. However, due
to the fact that they will almost surely fall into the area of poverty, requiring governments to pay
the subsidy in addition to the cost of lifting a household out of poverty, it is not optimal to fully
subsidise the loading factor for the most vulnerable, since the cost of social protection is higher than
that for uninsured households. Note that, from the point of view of the governmental cost of social
protection, Figure 6 confirms earlier statements asserting the inefficiency of providing premium
support to the most vulnerable, i.e. neither individual households nor governments receive real
benefit under such a scheme. Thus, alternative risk management strategies should be considered
for this sector of the low-income population.




















Insured Subsidised Household (θ* = 0, β = 0.5)
Insured Household
Figure 6: Cost of social protection for the uninsured, insured and insured subsidised capital pro-
cesses when Zi ∼ Exp(1), r = 0.5, λ = 1, x∗ = 1, κ = 0.5, θ = 0.5, δ = 0.9 and M = 8 for loading
factor θ∗ = 0.
6 Microinsurance with Subsidised Flexible Premiums
6.1 General Setting
Since premiums are generally paid as soon as microinsurance coverage is purchased, a household’s
capital growth could be constrained. It is therefore interesting to consider alternative premium pay-
ment mechanisms. From the point of view of microinsurance providers, advance premium payments
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are preferred so that additional income can be generated through investment, naturally leading to
lower premium rates. Conversely, consumers may find it difficult to pay premiums up front. This
is a common problem in low-income populations, with consumers preferring to pay smaller install-
ments over time (Churchill and Matul, 2006). Collecting premiums at a time that is inconvenient for
households can be futile. Flexible premium payment mechanisms have been highly adopted by in-
formal funeral insurers in South Africa, where policyholders pay premiums whenever they are able,
rather than at a specific time during the month (Roth, 2000). Similar alternative insurance designs
in which premium payments are delayed until the insured’s income is realised and any indemnities
are paid have also been studied. Under such designs, insurance take-up increases, since liquidity
constraints are relaxed and concerns regarding insurer default, also prevalent in low-income classes,
reduce (Liu, 2016).
In this section, we introduce an alternative microinsurance subsidy scheme with flexible premium
payments. We denote the capital process of a household enrolled in the alternative microinsurance
subsidy scheme by X (A)t . Furthermore, as in Section 4, we differentiate between variables and
parameters relating to the original, insured and alternative insured processes using the superscript
(A). Under such an alternative microinsurance subsidy scheme, households pay premiums when
their capital is above some capital barrier B ≥ x(A)∗, with the premium otherwise paid by the
government. In other words, whenever the insured capital process is below the capital level B,
premiums are entirely subsidised by the government, however, when a household’s capital is above
B, the premium π is paid continuously by the household itself. This method of premium collection
may motivate households to maintain a level of capital below B in order to avoid premium payments.
Consequently, we assume that households always pursue capital growth. Our aim is to study how
this alternative microinsurance subsidy scheme can help households reduce their probability of
falling into the area of poverty. We also measure the cost-effectiveness of such scheme from the
point of view of the government.
The intangibility of microinsurance makes it difficult to attract potential clients. Most clients will
never experience a claim and so cannot perceive the real value of microinsurance, paying more to
the scheme (in terms of premium payments) than what they actually receive from it. It is only
when claims are settled that microinsurance becomes tangible. The alternative microinsurance
subsidy scheme described here could increase client value, since, for example, individuals below the
barrier B may submit claims, receive a payout and therefore perceive the value of microinsurance
when they suffer a loss, regardless of whether they have ever paid a single premium. Other ways
of increasing microinsurance client value include bundling microinsurance with other products and
introducing Value Added Services (VAS), which represent services such as telephone hotlines for
consultation with doctors or remote diagnosis services (for health schemes) offered to clients outside
of the microinsurance contract (?).
Under the alternative microinsurance subsidy scheme, the Laplace transform of the trapping time
















m(A)δ (x) for x















m(A)δ (x) for x ≥ B.
(6.1)
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As in Section 3, use of the change of variable y(A) := y(A)(x) = −α(κ)(x − x(A)∗) leads to Kummer’s







































for x ≥ B,
for arbitrary constants C1, C2, C3, C4 ∈ R. Under the boundary condition limx→∞m(A)δ (x) = 0 with
asymptotic behaviour of the Kummer function M(a, c; z) as presented in Section 3, we deduce that
C3 = 0. Also, since m(A)δ (x









Due to the continuity of the functions m(A)δ (x) and m
(A)′
δ (x) at x = B and the differential properties
of the Confluent Hypergeometric Functions
d
dz
M(a, c; z) =
a
c
M(a+ 1, c+ 1; z),
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, x ≥ B.




where ψ(A,B∗)(x) and ψ(x) denote the trapping probability of the capital process under the
alternative microinsurance subsidy scheme and the uninsured capital process, respectively.
Some examples are presented after the remarks.
(ii) When B → x(A)∗, the trapping probability for the alternative microinsurance subsidy scheme































(iii) Figure 7 displays the expected trapping time under the alternative microinsurance subsidy
scheme. Not surprisingly, the expected trapping time is an increasing function of both the
















Figure 7: Expected trapping time when Zi ∼ Exp(1), λ = 1, x = 3.5, x(A)∗ = 1, κ = 0.5 and θ = 0.5
for r = 0.08, 0.082, 0.084.
Figure 8(a) shows the trapping probabilities for varying initial capital values under the uninsured,
insured, subsidised and alternatively subsidised schemes. As expected, increasing the value of the
capital barrier B helps households to reduce their probability of falling into the area of poverty,
since support from the government is received when their capital resides in the region between
the critical capital x(A)∗ and the barrier B. Furthermore, as in the previous case, households with
higher levels of initial capital do not need support from the government, insurance without subsidies
decreases their trapping probability to a level below the uninsured (households with initial capital
greater than or equal to the point at which the dotted line intersects the solid line).
The optimal barrier for these individuals is in fact the critical capital, i.e., B∗ = x(A)∗, households
with higher initial capital can therefore afford to pay for microinsurance coverage themselves, as
illustrated in Figure 8(b). Figure 8(b) also shows that for the most vulnerable, the government
should set up a barrier above their initial capital to remove capital growth constraints associated
with premium payments. This level should be selected until the household reaches a capital level
that is adequate in ensuring their trapping probability will be equal to that of an uninsured house-
hold. Conversely, for the more privileged (those in Figure 8(b), with initial capital approximately
greater than or equal to 2), the government should establish barriers below their initial capital,
with households paying premiums themselves as soon as they enrol in the microinsurance scheme.
This behaviour is mainly due to the fact that their level of capital is distant from the critical capital
x(A)∗. These households are unlikely to fall into the area of poverty after suffering one capital loss,
they are instead likely to fall into the region between the critical capital and the barrier B (i.e. the
area within which the government pays premiums), before entering the area of poverty. Thus, the
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aforementioned region acts as a “buffer” for households, since once in this region they will benefit
from coverage without paying any premiums. Increasing the initial capital will lead to a decrease
in the size of the “buffer” region until it disappears when B = x(A)∗, as shown in the lower right
corner of Figure 8(b), where a straight line is visible.

























Insured Subsidised Household (θ* = 0, β = 0.5)
Insured Household
Insured Alternatively Subsidised Household (B = 2)
Insured Alternatively Subsidised Household (B = 4)
(a)




















Figure 8: (a) Trapping probabilities for the uninsured, insured, insured subsidised with θ∗ = 0 and
insured alternatively subsidised with B = 2, 4 capital processes when Zi ∼ Exp(1), r = 0.5, λ = 1,
x∗ = 1, κ = 0.5 and θ = 0.5 (b) Difference between the optimal barrier and the initial capital,
i.e. B∗ − x, for varying initial capitals, when Zi ∼ Exp(1), r = 0.5, λ = 1, x(A)∗ = 1, κ = 0.5 and
θ = 0.5.
6.2 Cost of Social Protection
Similarly to the previous section, it is reasonable to measure the governmental cost-effectiveness
of providing microinsurance premium subsidies to households under the alternative microinsurance
subsidy scheme. For this reason, we define V (A)(x) as the expectation of the present value of all
subsidies provided by the government until the trapping time under the alternative microinsurance
subsidy scheme, that is








∣∣∣∣X (A)0 = x] .
If the derivative exists, then using standard infinitesimal generator arguments for X (A)t , one gets the
23
following IDE for V (A)(x) under the barrier B
r(x−x(A)∗)V (A)′(x)− (λ+δ)V (A)(x)+λ
∫ x−x(A)∗
0
V (A)(x−z)dG(z)+π = 0, x(A)∗ ≤ x ≤ B. (6.4)





















= 0, x(A)∗ ≤ x ≤ B. (6.5)
Letting V (A)h (x) be the homogeneous solution of (6.5), we have

















, x(A)∗ ≤ x ≤ B,
for arbitrary constants R1, R2 ∈ R, where y(A)(x) = −α(κ)(x− x(A)∗).
Since the general solution of (6.5) can be written as
V (A)(x) = V (A)h (x) + V
(A)
p (x),
where V (A)p (x) is a particular solution, one can easily verify that V (A)p (x) =
π
δ for all x
(A)∗ ≤ x ≤ B.














For x(A)∗ ≤ x ≤ B, we therefore have


































Above the barrier B, V (A)(x) satisfies (6.1) for x ≥ B, and so

















, x ≥ B,
for arbitrary constants R3, R4 ∈ R. Since limx→∞ V (A)(x) = 0 by definition, we have that R3 = 0.
Using the continuity of the functions V (A)(x) and V (A)′(x) at x = B and the differential properties





















































































where D and K are (6.2) and (6.3), respectively.
Figure 9 compares the cost of social protection for the uninsured, insured, insured subsidised and
insured alternatively subsidised households. Cost of social protection for the most vulnerable is not
reduced with microinsurance coverage (dotted, dashed and dash-dotted lines are all above the solid
line for initial capitals close to the critical capital x∗). As mentioned previously, this corresponds
to the high trapping probability of this section of the population, with governments almost surely
needing to lift these households out of the area of poverty through payment of a certain amountM ,
in addition to paying subsidies. On the other hand, the cost of social protection could be reduced
by providing subsidies to households with greater levels of initial capital (when dashed and dash-
dotted lines are below the solid line). Greater initial capitals lead to lower trapping probabilities
and a reduction in the likelihood of the government need to pay the value M . As a result, the cost
of social protection decreases even though subsidies are provided.
Also illustrated in Figure 9 is the greater cost-effectiveness of conditionally subsidising premiums, in
comparison to proportional subsidisation (dashed-dotted line below all other lines for the majority
of households in this particular group). Besides lowering the cost of social protection compared to
that of uninsured households, it outperforms the traditional insured subsidised case in which some
of the loading factor is absorbed by the government. Moreover, the alternative scheme eliminates
the disadvantage of paying subsidies indefinitely for the “richest” households almost surely. In con-
sequence, implementing a microinsurance scheme with barrier strategy reduces both the probability
of households falling into the area of poverty and the governmental cost of social protection (shown
in Figure 8(a) and Figure 9, respectively).
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Insured Subsidised Household (θ* = 0, β = 0.5)
Insured Household
Insured Alternatively Subsidised Household (B = 3)
Figure 9: Cost of social protection for the uninsured, insured, insured subsidised with θ∗ = 0 and
insured alternatively subsidised with B = 3 capital processes, when Zi ∼ Exp(1), r = 0.5, λ = 1,
x∗ = 1, κ = 0.5, θ = 0.5, δ = 0.9 and M = 8.
7 Conclusion
Comparing the impact of three microinsurance mechanisms on the trapping probability of low-
income households, we provide evidence for the importance of governmentally supported inclusive
insurance in the strive towards poverty alleviation. The results of Sections 4 and 5 support those
of Kovacevic and Pflug (2011), highlighting a threshold below which insurance increases the prob-
ability of trapping. Further to these findings, we have introduced an alternative mechanism with
the capacity to reduce this effect, while strengthening government social protection programs by
lowering costs.
Analysis of the subsidised microinsurance scheme with premium payment barrier, suggests that in
general, the trapping probability of a household is reduced in comparison to basic microinurance
and subsidised microinsurance structures, in addition to that of uninsured households. More sig-
nificant influence is observed in relation to the governmental cost of social protection, with the
cease of subsidy payments when household capital is sufficient facilitating government savings and
therefore increasing social protection efficiency. Cost of social protection for those closest to the
area of poverty remains greater than the corresponding uninsured cost in both subsidised schemes
considered. For such households, governments must account for both their support of premium
payments and the likely need for household removal from poverty. Government endorsement of
further alternative risk mitigation strategies, such as asset accumulation, would be beneficial for
those with capital close to the critical level, minimising their risk of falling beneath the poverty
line, while reducing social protection costs.
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